Limitations in the Effectiveness of United States Economic Sanctions in Altering Russian Behavior in the Russia -Ukraine Conflict, 2014 -2022
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.58421/misro.v5i3.1817Keywords:
Drezner Framework, Economic Coercion, Economic Sanctions, Qualitative Case Study, Russia -Ukraine Conflict, Sanctions EffectivenessAbstract
Economic sanctions are widely used as instruments of international coercion, yet their ability to generate political compliance remains contested. The Russia -Ukraine conflict provides an important case because extensive U.S. sanctions imposed against Russia since 2014 have created significant economic pressure but have not resulted in substantial changes in Russian strategic behavior. This study addresses the gap in sanctions research by examining why economic costs do not always translate into behavioral change. This study aims to explain the limited effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions against Russia during the 2014 - 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict and to identify the factors enabling Russia to resist sanctions pressure. Using a qualitative explanatory approach with an embedded single-case study design, this research analyzes documentary data from government documents, international organizations, academic publications, and institutional reports. Data were examined through directed qualitative content analysis and process tracing based on Drezner’s economic coercion framework. The findings show that U.S. sanctions were effective in imposing economic costs by restricting Russia’s access to finance, technology acquisition, and international economic integration. However, their effectiveness in producing behavioral change remained limited because Russia developed adaptive capacities through energy revenues, reserve management, import substitution, domestic institutional adjustment, and economic cooperation with non-Western partners. This study concludes that sanctions should not be evaluated solely by whether they produce political compliance. Instead, sanctions may succeed in imposing costs and constraining capabilities while failing to alter state behavior. The study contributes to economic coercion literature by highlighting the importance of target-state resilience, adaptation mechanisms, and strategic expectations in determining sanctions outcomes.
Downloads
References
G. V Danie and E. V Senewe, ‘Tindakan Aneksasi Rusia terhadap Wilayah Ukraina Dalam Hukum Internasional’, J. Fak. Ilmu Huk. Univ. Sam Ratulangi, 2023.
B. B. C. News, ‘Why Crimea is so dangerous’, BBC News, 2014.
K. T. Afif, ‘Ukraine and Russia War: Decoding Regional Dispute as a Catalyst for a New Cold War Era Between USA and Russia’, Int. J. Res. Innov. Soc. Sci., 2024.
U. K. Parliament, ‘Conflict in Ukraine: A timeline (2014 - eve of 2022 invasion)’, House of Commons Library, 2023.
T. W. House, ‘President Obama Announces New Ukraine-Related Sanctions’, 2014, Office of the Press Secretary.
U. S. D. of the Treasury, ‘Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and Energy Sectors of Russia’, 2014.
U. S. G. A. Office, ‘Russia Sanctions and Export Controls: U.S. Agencies Should Establish Targets to Better Assess Effectiveness’, GAO, 2025.
U. S. D. of the Treasury, ‘U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs’, 2022.
I. Estevao and G. Iradian, ‘Russia’s Sanctions Have Failed, but Buffers Are Wearing Thin’, IIF Glob. Macro Views, 2025.
C. on F. Relations, ‘Three Years of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?’, 2025.
D. W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
C. Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2015.
R. K. Yin, Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods, 6th ed. Los Angeles: Sage, 2018.
M. Zed, Metode Penelitian Kepustakaan. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2014.
L. S. Nowell, J. M. Norris, D. E. White, and N. J. Moules, ‘Thematic Analysis: Striving to Meet the Trustworthiness Criteria’, Int. J. Qual. Methods, 2017.
W. Bank, ‘Population and income classification data for the Russian Federation’, 2025.
U. S. E. I. Administration, ‘Russia’s oil exports have decreased modestly since 2022, shifting toward Asia’, 2025.
W. Bank, ‘Russia economic contraction estimate’, 2023.
F. House, ‘Russia freedom status report’, 2025.
D. Drezner, ‘The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion’, Int. Organ., 2003.
E. Chachko and J. B. Heath, ‘A Watershed Moment for Sanctions? Russia, Ukraine, and the Economic Battlefield’, Am. J. Int. Law, 2022.
U. S. D. of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Prohibits Transactions with Central Bank of Russia and Imposes Sanctions on Key Sources of Russia’s Wealth’, 2022.
K. S. E. I. Russia, ‘Russia’s Economy at the End of 2024’, 2024.
S. Barisitz and Y. Evdokimova, ‘Russian trade settlement currency composition analysis’, 2023.
V. Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015.
R. Connolly, Russia’s Response to Sanctions: How Western Economic Statecraft is Shaping Political Economy in Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
R. N. Agency, ‘Russia-China trade turnover rises by 29.3% to record-breaking $190 bln in 2022’, 2023.
Reuters, ‘Indian crude oil import data from Russia’, 2025.
W. D. Drezner, ‘Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion’, Int. Stud. Q., 1998.
L. Center, ‘Russian public opinion survey’, 2024.
Downloads
Additional Files
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Mathematics Instruction, Social Research and Opinion

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

















