

Collaborative Stakeholder Networks in Elderly Welfare Program Implementation: A Social Network Analysis of the ROSELA Program in Lamongan Regency, Indonesia

Bagus Surya Dwitama¹, Mochammad Rozikin², Moh. Said³

^{1,2,3}Fakultas Ilmu Administrasi, Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia

Article Info

Article history:

Received 2026-06-26

Revised 2026-07-21

Accepted 2026-07-23

Keywords:

Collaborative governance

Elderly welfare

Policy implementation

Social network analysis

Stakeholder network

ABSTRACT

Local governments in Indonesia increasingly rely on multi-actor collaboration to deliver targeted social assistance to vulnerable groups, including the elderly poor. This study examines the stakeholder network underlying the Elderly Welfare Program (Program Sejahtera Lansia, ROSELA) implemented by the Social Affairs Office of Lamongan Regency, which provides a food-assistance cash transfer of Rp900,000 per beneficiary family (Keluarga Penerima Manfaat, KPM) every three months, reaching 80 KPM across eight sub-districts (kelurahan) in Lamongan District by fiscal year 2026. Using a descriptive qualitative case-study design, primary data were collected through in-depth interviews and field observation of purposively selected informants, complemented by secondary data from technical operational guidelines and integrated social welfare records. Data were analysed using Creswell's qualitative analysis procedure and interpreted through three complementary frameworks: Social Network Analysis (SNA), the policy implementation model of Van Meter and Van Horn, and Van Waarden's seven dimensions of policy networks. Findings show that the ROSELA network is complex and multi-actor, with the Social Affairs Office occupying a central hub position; high density at the operational level but low density across sectors; an isolated cluster of unregistered elderly; and the strongest triadic closure among the village head, social assistance officer, and food-catering provider. Policy standards are clear at the output level but not the outcome level; financial resources are adequate through partnership with a regional bank, but human resources and legal grounding remain weak. The network is best characterised as a centralised, hierarchical, directive network at a moderate level of institutionalisation, with uneven power distribution favouring government actors over beneficiaries. The study concludes that ROSELA is operationally effective but institutionally fragile, and recommends a permanent legal framework, cross-sectoral integration, and formal participation channels for beneficiaries.

This is an open-access article under the [CC BY-SA](#) license.



Corresponding Author:

Bagus Surya Dwitama

Fakultas Ilmu Administrasi, Universitas Brawijaya

Email: bagus.dwitama@student.ub.ac.id

1. INTRODUCTION

Economic development in developing countries such as Indonesia is not merely about raising per capita income; it also concerns structural transformation, social welfare improvements, and the equitable distribution of development outcomes. The government plays a decisive role in this process, particularly in mitigating poverty, reducing interregional disparities, and strengthening national economic competitiveness [1]. Although Indonesia has experienced relatively stable economic growth in recent years, this growth has not been fully reflected in equitable welfare improvement; regional economic gaps, disguised unemployment, and unequal access to economic resources persist, prompting sustained government reliance on social assistance (bansos) programs to protect low-income households from economic shocks and strengthen access to basic services.

Social assistance programs implemented in Indonesia, including the Family Hope Program (PKH), Non-Cash Food Assistance (BPNT), and Direct Cash Assistance (BLT), have targeted millions of beneficiary families, yet numerous studies document recurring implementation challenges: mistargeting, inconsistent quality of the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS), delayed distribution, and weak oversight at the local level [2]. Cases have been documented of deceased individuals remaining listed as beneficiaries and of persistent data errors even after correction efforts [2]. Separately, distribution of direct cash assistance has been found suboptimal due to government unpreparedness and the absence of adequate decision-support systems for identifying eligible poor households [3]. In the specific context of elderly social assistance, a study on collaborative oversight found that distribution frequently fails to reach eligible target households. In contrast, non-eligible households receive benefits, a problem attributed in part to the absence of collaborative rather than closed internal oversight mechanisms [4].

These recurring problems underscore that effective public program delivery cannot rest on a single government actor; it requires coordinated engagement among multiple stakeholders with complementary resources and capacities. This premise aligns with the paradigm shift from government to governance, in which the state increasingly acts as a facilitator or director rather than sole implementer, opening space for private-sector and civil-society actors to participate in public service delivery [5]. Within the New Public Governance paradigm, collaborative governance has emerged as an operational framework for how government and non-government stakeholders can work together on an equal and consensual basis to formulate and implement public policy. It is commonly defined as a governing arrangement in which public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative collective decision-making process [6], later extended to emphasise cross-boundary engagement of actors across organisational, governmental, and public-private-civic lines to achieve outcomes unattainable by any single party [7].

Local governments (provincial, regency/city, and village/sub-district) are the frontline agents of social assistance distribution because they are closest to real conditions on the ground. Under Indonesia's decentralised governance system, regional governments hold a strategic role as the primary implementers of grassroots-level social assistance

delivery; program success is determined not only by national policy design but also by regional government capacity, commitment, and governance quality in translating policy into targeted, accountable, and sustainable practice.

Lamongan Regency has demonstrated a commitment to improving the welfare of its elderly population through the Elderly Welfare Program (ROSELA), which provides food assistance, cash transfers, health services, and community-based support. The Social Affairs Office administers the program as the leading sector. It involves numerous stakeholders: the Regent (Bupati), sub-district head (Camat), village heads (Lurah), a regional development bank (Bank Jatim), village-level social assistance officers, PKK cadres, food-catering providers, and elderly beneficiaries themselves. Given this actor complexity, program success is substantially shaped by the stakeholder network pattern among these actors, an issue that has received limited empirical attention in the Indonesian elderly-welfare policy literature using network-analytic methods.

This study, therefore, aims to: (1) analyse the stakeholder network pattern in the implementation of the ROSELA Program; (2) identify the factors influencing the success of that stakeholder network, using the policy implementation model of Van Meter and Van Horn; and (3) analyse the implementation of the ROSELA Program through the seven-dimensional policy-network lens proposed by Van Waarden. The findings are expected to contribute both academically as a reference on collaborative stakeholder networks in local elderly-welfare programs and practically, by informing policy design for the Lamongan regional government and offering a transferable analytical template for similar programs elsewhere in Indonesia.

2. METHOD

2.1. Research Approach and Design

This study employed a descriptive qualitative approach with a case-study design, consistent with Creswell's characterisation of qualitative inquiry as research conducted in a natural setting, using the researcher as the key instrument, drawing on multiple sources of data, and employing inductive-deductive analysis to build patterns, categories, and themes while remaining attentive to participants' meanings and to the researcher's own reflexivity [8]. A case-study design was selected because it enables an in-depth, contextualised understanding of a bounded system, here, the stakeholder network surrounding a specific local social-assistance program, rather than a generalised cross-case comparison.

2.2. Research Focus

Following Kickert's conceptualization of collaborative stakeholders [9], the research focus was structured around three areas: (1) the pattern of collaborative stakeholder engagement in ROSELA implementation, covering government and non-government actors; (2) the factors influencing the success of that collaboration stakeholder involvement, communication, collaboration, transparency, and effectiveness; and (3) programmatic outcomes analyzed through the six variables of the Van Meter and Van Horn policy-implementation model: policy standards and objectives, policy resources, inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, characteristics of the

implementing agency, economic-social-political conditions, and the disposition of implementers [10].

2.3. Research Site

The study was conducted at the Social Affairs Office of Lamongan Regency, East Java Province, selected because it is the leading sector responsible for ROSELA and holds a central coordinating position in the program's operational network.

2.4. Data Sources and Collection Techniques

Primary data were obtained through in-depth interviews and field observation of purposively selected informants, including officials of the Social Affairs Office, sub-district and village officers, social assistance officers, and other relevant parties directly involved in program implementation. Secondary data were obtained from the Program's Technical Operational Guidelines (JUKNIS), the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS), the Regional Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD), and other institutional documents. Purposive sampling criteria required informants to be (1) directly involved in program planning, (2) directly involved in poverty-alleviation program implementation, (3) engaged over a sustained period rather than briefly, and (4) directly affected by or participating in the poverty-reduction process. Data collection combined document study and semi-structured, in-depth interviews guided by a pre-developed interview protocol, supplemented by field notes and audio-visual documentation.

2.5. Data Analysis

Data were analysed following Creswell's six-step qualitative analysis procedure: organising and preparing data, reading through the entire dataset, initiating coding, generating themes from the coding process, representing themes narratively, and interpreting the findings [8]. These analyses were subsequently deepened through three analytical lenses. First, Social Network Analysis (SNA) was used, following Valente et al. [11] and Milward and Provan [12], to characterise network components, density, centrality, isolates, and transitivity. Second, the Van Meter and Van Horn policy-implementation model [10] was applied to examine the six variables shaping implementation performance. Third, Van Waarden's seven dimensions of policy network actors, function, structure, institutionalisation, rules of conduct, power relations, and actor strategies were applied to characterise the overall network type [13].

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Program Overview

ROSELA is a Lamongan Regency government initiative under the Social Affairs Office, technically regulated through the Technical Operational Guidelines for the Management of Poor Household Data for the ROSELA Program Economic Development Assistance Facilitation Sub-Activity. In fiscal year 2025, the program targeted 72 beneficiary families; by fiscal year 2026, coverage was formally expanded to 80 KPM spread across eight kelurahan within Lamongan sub-district, as stipulated in the Regent's

Decree on the Determination of Beneficiary Names under the Yakin Semua Sejahtera (YSS) umbrella program, of which ROSELA is a continuation. Each beneficiary family receives a cash transfer of Rp900,000 every three months, calculated from a daily food allowance of Rp15,000 (covering two meals, lunch and afternoon) distributed on a rotating basis among participating kelurahan, with each kelurahan receiving a three-month service turn within the annual budget cycle.

3.2. Social Network Analysis of the ROSELA Network

1) Network Components: Consistent with the SNA framework of Valente et al. [11], the ROSELA network comprises identifiable nodes and links across four actor categories, summarised in Table I.

Table 1. Stakeholder Categories in The Rosela Network

Category	Representative Actors	Primary Role
Government actors	Social Affairs Office (Social Protection Division), Regent, Sub-district Head, Village Heads (8 kelurahan), Inspectorate	Coordination, regulation, oversight
Technical implementers	Bank Jatim, Village Social Assistance Officers, and PKK cadres	Fund disbursement, verification, and field assistance
Service providers	Food-catering providers ("warung")	Meal preparation and delivery
Beneficiaries	72–80 elderly KPM (≥ 65 years, poor/near-poor)	Program recipients

2) Density: Network density is high at the operational level among the Social Affairs Office, village heads, PKK, social assistance officers, and food providers, but considerably lower at the cross-sectoral level, such as between the Social Affairs Office and the Health Office or civil-society organisations. The most intensive relationship occurs between village social assistance officers and beneficiaries, who interact daily during meal delivery and documentation, while oversight relations with the Inspectorate remain periodic. This pattern is consistent with Milward and Provan's observation that operational-level density in human-services networks typically exceeds policy-level density [12].

3) Centrality: The Social Affairs Office, particularly its Social Protection Division, occupies the position of broker and coordinator with the highest degree of betweenness centrality, since nearly all information flows, technical instructions, resources, and accountability reports pass through it. Village heads function as hubs at the kelurahan level, connecting district-level policy with field implementation, a strategically important but potentially bottleneck-prone position. Village social assistance officers exhibit the highest closeness centrality, given their daily interactions with beneficiaries.

4) Isolates: Two isolated clusters were identified: elderly individuals not yet registered in the DTKS or verified through village deliberation (musyawarah kelurahan, muskel) mechanisms, and civil-society organisations (e.g., elderly-focused posyandu groups) that possess informal knowledge of elderly conditions but remain formally unintegrated into

the network. As Valente et al. note, isolates in program-implementation networks often represent the population segment most in need of intervention yet hardest to reach [11].

5) Transitivity: The strongest triadic closure occurs among the village head, social assistance officer, and food-catering provider, forming a solid, mutually reinforcing operational cluster. Secondary triads were identified between the Social Affairs Office, Bank Jatim, and beneficiaries, and between the Sub-district Head, village heads, and PKK.

3.3. Factors Influencing Implementation Performance (Van Meter and Van Horn Model)

Table 2 summarises the six implementation variables and corresponding findings.

Table 2. Van Meter and Van Horn Variables Applied to The Rosela Program

Variable	Key Finding
Policy standards and objectives	Clear at output level (beneficiary count, transfer amount); not yet defined at outcome level (health, nutrition, subjective well-being)
Policy resources	Financial resources are adequate via Bank Jatim partnership; human resources (social assistance officers) are limited; no permanent legal basis.
Inter-organisational communication and enforcement	Vertical communication is solid (formal and informal channels); horizontal cross-OPD communication is weak; enforcement is administrative and periodic only.
Characteristics of the implementing agency	Centralised-hierarchical; efficient coordination, but high dependency on a single node; limited openness to non-government actors
Economic, social, and political conditions	Local fiscal limitations constrain coverage; strong local wisdom (muskel, mutual cooperation) supports targeting; annual political discretion creates continuity risk.
Disposition of implementers	High commitment, including extra-role behaviour among field officers; inadequate incentives risk burnout and turnover

Policy standards and objectives are formally articulated in the Technical Operational Guidelines, specifying the Rp15,000 daily food allowance equivalent to Rp900,000 per KPM every three months and clear administrative eligibility criteria (DTKS or non-DTKS registration, minimum age 65, living alone or without a fixed income). However, this clarity applies only to output-level indicators; no outcome-level success indicators, such as improvements in nutritional status, health, or subjective well-being, have been formulated. This gap is consistent with broader critiques of Indonesian social policy, which tend toward an administrative-target orientation rather than a substantive-impact orientation [14].

Financial resources are channelled through the regional budget (APBD) with Bank Jatim as the official disbursement partner, lending administrative accountability to fund transfers for the 72–80 KPM. Human resource capacity, however, is constrained: the number of village social assistance officers relative to caseload creates a risk of burnout, and the absence of a permanent regional regulation (Perda) or Regent's Regulation (Perbup) means budget allocation remains annually discretionary and politically

contingent, a vulnerability also identified in COVID-era social assistance research [15], [2].

Communication follows a vertical chain from the Social Affairs Office through the Sub-district Head to village heads and finally to field-level social assistance officers, reinforced by both formal (coordination meetings, JUKNIS) and informal (phone, instant messaging) channels, the latter playing a substantial practical role in daily coordination. Horizontal communication across regional agencies, such as between the Social Affairs Office and the Health Office regarding elderly posyandu services, remains underdeveloped, keeping the network largely sectoral. Enforcement rests on periodic Inspectorate oversight legitimised by a Regent's Decree, but lacks the stronger enforceability of a Perda/Perbup.

The implementing agency is organised into four divisions, with the Poor Household Handling Division directly responsible for ROSELA. The organisation exhibits a centralised-hierarchical character that yields coordination efficiency but concentrates dependency on a single node, consistent with the centrality findings above. Economically, Lamongan's limited fiscal capacity constrains coverage to 80 KPM in eight kelurahan against a substantially larger population of near-poor residents recorded in the 2022 DTKS (654,426 individuals). Socially, local wisdom embodied in muskel deliberation and mutual-cooperation norms strengthens legitimacy and targeting accuracy. Politically, program continuity depends heavily on the Regent's annual commitment, given the absence of a permanent legal umbrella. Finally, the implementer's disposition, reflected in sustained budget allocation by the Regent and the Social Affairs Office head, and in extra-role commitment among field officers and PKK cadres, remains a significant enabling factor, though under-supported by adequate honoraria, risking long-term turnover.

3.4. Network Characterisation via Van Waarden's Seven Dimensions

Table 3 presents the synthesis of the seven-dimension analysis.

Table 3. Van Waarden's Seven Dimensions Applied To The Rosela Network

Dimension	Finding
Actors	Government, technical implementer, and beneficiary actors present; NGOs and professional bodies (e.g., nutritionists) not yet integrated.
Function	Primarily distributive (benefit disbursement, data verification); transformative functions (empowerment, health integration) are underdeveloped.
Structure	Hierarchical-centralised; formal, SK-verified membership; informal coordination via communication apps supplements formal channels
Institutionalization	Moderate: clear technical/legal basis (JUKNIS, national regulations) but no dedicated Perda/Perbup
Rules of conduct	Formal SOPs plus informal norms of trust and mutual care rooted in local culture
Power relations	Concentrated in government actors (Regent, Social Affairs Office); beneficiaries hold the weakest power with no formal voice channel.
Actor strategies	Top-down coordination (Social Affairs Office), participatory legitimation via muskel (village heads), scheduled service (Bank Jatim), personal/kinship approach (social assistance officers)

Taken together, these seven dimensions indicate that the ROSELA network functions as a directive, hierarchical, and centralised network rather than the more horizontal, decentralised policy-network form typically assumed in the broader policy-network literature [16], [17]. This contrasts with findings from an irrigation-management policy network in the Colo system, where government functioned as a more equal switchboard among relatively co-dependent stakeholders [18]; the divergence is attributable to the intrinsically top-down nature of direct cash-transfer programs, which involve public-budget allocation and administrative accountability to the head of the regional government, a pattern consistent with Carlsson's argument that policy-network form is strongly shaped by sectoral characteristics and the nature of exchanged resources [19].

3.5. Cross-Framework Synthesis

The convergence of the three analytical lenses yields a coherent picture. The network is brokered around a single core agency, a pattern typical of human-services networks, where government actors dominate coordination due to budgetary authority and legal legitimacy [12], but one that also raises the theoretical risk of single-point-of-failure vulnerability as centrality concentrates on a single node [20]. High operational density but low cross-sectoral density signals a network still vertical-bureaucratic rather than the horizontal collaborative-governance ideal [6], [7], diverging from evidence elsewhere that horizontal civil-society engagement strengthens social-policy network capacity [21]. The presence of unregistered elderly individuals as isolated reflects a structural gap between the population most in need and the actual network reach [11], echoing data-accuracy problems documented broadly in Indonesian social-assistance delivery [22], [2]. Strong triadic closure at the *kelurahan* level reflects genuine trust clusters that reinforce daily efficiency [23], though its concentration at a single operational tier, rather than replication across sectors, confirms that network strength remains local rather than integrated.

The interdependence among Van Meter and Van Horn's variables is also evident: limited implementer numbers and absent permanent legal grounding interact with weak enforcement and heavy reliance on annual political conditions consistent with the proposition that implementation is not a linear policy-to-outcome process but one shaped by dynamic interaction among environmental variables [10], a pattern paralleled in other Indonesian social-assistance studies where data, resource, and legal weaknesses tend to compound one another rather than occur independently [24], [2]. Notably, high implementer disposition appears to function as a temporary buffer against structural resource and enforcement weaknesses [25], though reliance on individual commitment alone is inherently unsustainable absent adequate institutional incentives.

4. CONCLUSION

This study examined the collaborative stakeholder network underlying the ROSELA elderly-welfare program in Lamongan Regency using Social Network Analysis, the Van Meter and Van Horn policy-implementation model, and Van Waarden's seven network dimensions. The findings show that ROSELA operates through a complex, multi-

actor network in which the Social Affairs Office functions as the central hub, network density is high operationally but low cross-sectorally, an isolated cluster of unregistered elderly persists, and the strongest triadic bond forms among the village head, social assistance officer, and food provider. Policy standards are clear only at the output level; financial resources are adequate, but human resources and legal grounding are limited; vertical communication is solid, while horizontal and enforcement mechanisms remain weak; the implementing agency is centralised and hierarchical; local wisdom offsets fiscal constraints; and implementer disposition is strongly positive but under-incentivised. Across all three frameworks, ROSELA is best characterised as a centralised, hierarchical directive network at a moderate level of institutionalisation, with power concentrated among government actors and beneficiaries holding the weakest voice.

The program is thus operationally effective at the local technical level but institutionally and politically vulnerable due to the absence of a permanent legal framework, weak cross-sectoral integration, and limited formal participation channels for beneficiaries. Accordingly, this study recommends: strengthening the program's legal foundation through a Regent's Regulation or a Regional Regulation; expanding program coverage; strengthening cross-agency integration, particularly with health services; enhancing social-assistance human resource capacity and incentives; and establishing formal participation channels for elderly beneficiaries. Future research should incorporate software-based SNA tools (e.g., UCINET, Gephi, NodeXL) for quantitative network mapping, extend analysis to outcome-level evaluation of elderly health and well-being, and pursue comparative studies with similar programs in other Indonesian regions.

REFERENCES

- [1] B. Tjokroamidjojo, *Perencanaan Pembangunan*. Jakarta, Indonesia: CV Haji Masagung, 1994.
- [2] K. S. Dewi, *Permasalahan Penyaluran Bantuan Sosial COVID-19 di Beberapa Daerah Indonesia*. Jakarta, Indonesia: SMERU Research Institute, 2020.
- [3] F. B. Hirawan, "Efektivitas kebijakan bantuan sosial di Indonesia dalam menghadapi pandemi COVID-19," *CSIS Commentaries*, no. DMRU-022-ID, 2020.
- [4] D. Herdiana, "Pengawasan kolaboratif dalam pelaksanaan kebijakan bantuan sosial lansia," *J. Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Publik*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 235–248, 2020.
- [5] A. Rohman, *Kebijakan Pemerintah dan Governansi Publik*. Malang, Indonesia: Cinta Media, 2019.
- [6] C. Ansell and A. Gash, "Collaborative governance in theory and practice," *J. Public Admin. Research and Theory*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 543–571, 2008.
- [7] K. Emerson, T. Nabatchi, and S. Balogh, "An integrative framework for collaborative governance," *J. Public Admin. Research and Theory*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1–29, 2012.
- [8] J. W. Creswell, *Research Design: Pendekatan Metode Kualitatif, Kuantitatif dan Campuran*, 4th ed. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Pelajar, 2016.
- [9] W. J. M. Kickert, E. H. Klijn, and J. F. M. Koppenjan, *Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector*. London, U.K.: SAGE Publications, 1997.
- [10] D. S. Van Meter and C. E. Van Horn, "The policy implementation process: A conceptual framework," *Administration and Society*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 445–488, 1975.
- [11] T. W. Valente, L. A. Palinkas, S. Czaja, K. H. Chu, and C. H. Brown, "Social network analysis for program implementation," *PLOS ONE*, vol. 10, no. 6, p. e0131712, 2015.
- [12] H. B. Milward and K. G. Provan, "Measuring network structure," *Public Administration*, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 387–407, 1998.
- [13] F. V. Waarden, "Dimensions and types of policy networks," *European J. Political Research*, vol. 21, no. 1–2, pp. 29–52, 1992.
- [14] B. Winarno, *Kebijakan Publik: Teori dan Proses*. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Media Pressindo, 2007.
- [15] W. Rahmansyah, R. A. Qadri, R. R. A. Sakti, and S. Ikhsan, "Pemetaan permasalahan penyaluran bantuan sosial untuk penanganan COVID-19 di Indonesia," *J. Pajak dan Keuangan Negara*, vol. 2,

- no. 1, pp. 90–102, 2020.
- [16] E. H. Klijn and J. F. M. Koppenjan, "Public management and policy networks: Foundations of a network approach to governance," *Public Management*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 135–158, 2000.
- [17] P. Kenis and V. Schneider, "Policy networks and policy analysis: Scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox," in *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations*, B. Marin and R. Mayntz, Eds. Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag, 1991, pp. 25–59.
- [18] R. A. R. Budyantoro, W. Widayati, and D. G. Mana, "Analisis jejaring kebijakan dalam pengelolaan sistem irigasi Colo sebagai bagian dari sistem sumber daya air wilayah sungai Bengawan Solo," *J. Manajemen Pelayanan Publik*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 45–62, 2020.
- [19] L. Carlsson, "Policy networks as collective action," *Policy Studies J.*, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 502–520, 2000.
- [20] S. P. Borgatti, M. G. Everett, and J. C. Johnson, *Analyzing Social Networks*. London, U.K.: SAGE Publications, 2013.
- [21] N. Zhou, X. Xiao, and F. Feng, "Citizen participation in the public policy process in China: Based on policy network theory," *Chinese Public Administration Review*, vol. 7, no. 3–4, pp. 28–42, 2014.
- [22] T. R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, 10th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice Hall, 2002.
- [23] R. A. W. Rhodes, "Analisis jaringan kebijakan," in *Handbook Kebijakan Publik*, M. Moran et al., Eds., Bandung, Indonesia: Nusa Media, 2015.
- [24] S. A. Abdul Wahab, *Analisis Kebijakan: Dari Formulasi ke Penyusunan Model-Model Implementasi Kebijakan Publik*. Jakarta, Indonesia: Bumi Aksara, 2012.
- [25] A. Wibowo and D. Rostyaningsih, "Analisis stakeholder dalam implementasi kebijakan publik," *J. Administrasi Pemerintahan Daerah*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 1–15, 2016.
-